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Abstract
This study is an exploratory analysis combining military construction (MILCON)
data from the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP) with the associated Automated Civil Engineer System project actual
costs. The analysis uses both descriptive and inferential statistics to identify cost growth
of MILCON at the programmatic level as well as to bridge the gap between SAR
estimates and actual project costs within those program-level estimates. Overall,
programs experience more negative growth (cost savings) in MILCON estimates on
SARs, typically less than 0.2% of the total program cost implying minimal impact to
program decisions. Estimates got more accurate from first to last SAR in comparison to
total MILCON programmed for all projects within the program. However, the last
SAR’s median MILCON cost estimate was approximately $31 million underestimated to
projects currently authorized and appropriated for the MDAPs. This could accumulate
and impact budgetary decisions of scarce fiscal resources. Several factors were identified
as potential drivers to MILCON cost growth within MDAPs, but require more data points
for regression modelling. Preliminary research was restricted to 32 programs, 10 with
authorized projects accessible for comparison, but initial results suggest building on this
exploratory analysis.
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ANALYSIS OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COST GROWTH IN
MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

I. Introduction
Cost estimating is a complex science; it is nearly impossible for total costs at
project or program completion to be exactly what the original cost estimate had quoted.
Cost estimating military construction (MILCON) projects is no different, and cost
estimating total MILCON projects for a major acquisition program up to a decade before
a requirement is operationally needed is even more complicated. A myriad of factors
within and outside of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) control can affect the
differences often reported between initial cost estimates and final costs of MILCON
projects. However, recent MILCON projects with cost overruns have raised
congressional concerns regarding the quality of DoD MILCON cost estimating practices,
emphasizing the importance of an accurate cost estimate (Government Accountability
Office [GAO], 2018).
For the purpose of this study, a distinction must be made regarding MILCON cost
growth and MILCON cost overruns. MILCON cost growth refers to the increase in cost
estimates for a project or program over time; it can also represent a positive difference
between an estimate at a given time and actual costs. MILCON cost overruns are the
increase of actual funds required to complete a project that has already been authorized
and appropriated for execution at a lower budgetary level. Previous research and
publications only address MILCON cost overruns for projects whereas this thesis aims to
address MILCON cost growth at a programmatic level.
1

Background
When the United States Air Force (USAF) acquires new programs, MILCON
project requirements accompany the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP).
U.S. Code Title 10 categorizes MDAPs as Acquisition Category I (ACAT 1) programs if
they meet any of the following threshold criteria (10 U.S.C. §2430, 2017):
•

Total eventual expenditure of research, development, test and evaluation
costs greater than $480 million (fiscal year 2014 constant dollars)

•

Total eventual expenditure of procurement costs greater than $2.79 billion
(fiscal year 2014 constant dollars)

•

Specifically designated by milestone decision authority as special interest

Appendix A defines the current ACAT thresholds for all categories (Acquisition
Category, 2017).
All MDAPs are required to submit periodic status reports to Congress containing
cost, schedule, and technical information; these congressional reports are Selected
Acquisition Reports (SAR) prepared by the respective program offices. The Secretary of
Defense and the Congress began requiring regular recurring reports in 1968 which
introduced the concept of SARs; they became permanent law in 1982 (GAO, 2009). The
annual reporting for a particular program may be terminated by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) when 90% of expected production
deliveries or planned acquisition expense have been made (SAR, 2018). Until such time,
reporting must continue periodically.
Title 10 USC § 2432 (2010) mandates that all anticipated system-specific
MILCON costs be estimated in every SAR for all MDAPs. Project cost estimates are
typically prepared by base-level civil engineer units at bases or headquarters where new
2

facilities are expected throughout the life of the program acquisition. The program office
is responsible for submitting an accumulated programmatic MILCON cost estimate in
each SAR submitted to Congress.
Congress has historically scrutinized the DoD for MILCON cost overruns of
projects from the time of funding appropriation through project completion. GAO
studies specific to MILCON cost estimates date back to 1981 with one as recent as 2018.
In these studies, GAO researched project-level cost overruns from MILCON estimates
submitted to Congress for appropriation one to five years prior to operational necessity
and construction contract award (GAO, 1981 and GAO, 2018). Overall, GAO found a
mixture of cost under- and overruns, determining that the DoD should improve its cost
estimating processes. The specific findings of these studies are outlined in Chapter II.
Contrary to project-level MILCON studies like the GAO’s, no published research
exists regarding program-level MILCON cost estimates submitted to Congress through
SARs. Civil engineers develop early estimates and program offices deliver these
estimates often up to a decade prior to contract bidding for the actual project requirement,
intimating the existence of even more uncertainty and complexity than previous research
has revealed at the project level.

Problem Statement
Decision makers at all levels require accurate cost estimates to make decisions
regarding acquisitions, upgrades, and maintenance of weapons systems. Inaccurate
MDAP cost estimates in a world of limited resources can present a concern for the
defense industry. When reviewing a full span of periodic SARs for a single MDAP,
3

MILCON cost estimates show a variety of growth, negative growth (cost savings), and
complete dismissal. It is understood that every program is different, every estimate is not
perfect, and MILCON cost estimating is considerably more complex at a program-level.
However, historical data exists and with proper research may provide insight on trends,
pitfalls, and potential empirical predictors. The research questions analyzed within this
thesis attempt to provide this insight.

Research Questions
1. What is the typical growth in program-level MILCON cost estimates for
MDAPs led by the USAF?
2. What are the leading trends or drivers of program-level MILCON cost
growth?
3. What is the gap between SAR reported program-level estimates and actual
project-level costs as of the current date of data (22 October 2018)?
Methodology
MILCON cost estimates reported on each periodic SAR for various MDAPs drive
the analysis in this thesis. The program-level dataset initially consisted of 1,344 SAR
records for 120 programs. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC)
provided 99% of this dataset and 1% came from the Defense Acquisition Management
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) SAR files directly to account for the most recent SARs,
after December 2015. The data formulation and verification stage outlined in Chapter III
left 32 programs with a total of 444 SAR records for analysis.

4

The first research question addresses typical cost growth in MILCON estimates
using descriptive statistics at the program level from SAR data. The second research
question explores potential trends and significant drivers of MILCON cost growth using
contingency tables of dummy variables of factors extracted from databases available.
Due to the small sample size, contingency tables analyze cost growths from various
stages of SAR reporting to various stages of current costs and Fisher’s Exact Test
identifies driver significance.
The final research question utilizes MILCON program data from SARs as well as
MILCON project data from Automated Civil Engineer System – Project Management
(ACES-PM). This system provided a dataset for every individual project associated with
ten selected MDAPs. Key data included project cost information in the amounts of
appropriation, obligation, and expenditure. Accumulated values for current actual project
costs were compared to SAR cost estimates to identify cost reporting gaps from projectlevel to program-level.

Assumptions and Limitations
The scope of programs within this study includes USAF-led MDAPs with
periodic SARs made available by AFLCMC or located within DAMIR. Additionally,
this research only includes uncancelled acquisition programs which reported a MILCON
cost for at least one SAR report. SAR data is from October 1966 to December 2017,
though all MILCON costs were normalized to constant year 2018.
ACES-PM was fielded in 2000 leaving a limited scope for project comparison
with programs. Only nine aircraft and one satellite MDAP had MILCON projects with
5

the acquisition program name in the construction project title within the scope of 2000 to
2017. To compare project-level costs to program-level costs, MILCON project values
were normalized to constant year 2018 as well.
All data was preprocessed for visible errors before analysis. For the SAR data,
185 reports of the 444 (42%) were verified in DAMIR to validate accuracy of the
AFLCMC internal SAR database. ACES-PM data was not verified against any
budgetary documents as the database was pulled from the system directly. After
preprocessing and verification where possible, all data used in analysis is assumed to
accurately depict both historical and current cost information as of 22 October 2018.

Implications
Having addressed the issue and researched historical data, attention should be
drawn to the MILCON cost estimates being reported to congressional decision makers on
the periodic SARs. The analysis within this exploratory thesis provides cost estimators
and program offices with a typical MILCON cost growth within MDAPs as well as
identifies potential drivers of program MILCON cost growths. Analysis has been
performed at both the acquisition program-level and the civil engineer project-level to
explore the potential gap between what is being reported and what is actually being
funded and executed.

Summary
This exploratory thesis addresses the typical growth in MILCON costs for major
acquisition programs and identifies potential drivers to MILCON cost growth within a
program. This chapter provided an overview of the issue and presented the research
6

questions which the thesis will address, analyze, and make conclusions upon. Chapter II
explores and summarizes additional background of the issue through literature reviews of
similar studies. Chapter III explains in detail the data and methodology used for the
analysis. Chapter IV contains the results and implications from the descriptive statistical
and contingency table analyses. Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis, applying the
analysis results to the research questions and suggesting possible future research
opportunities regarding MILCON cost estimating for acquisition programs.

7

II. Literature Review
This chapter discusses previous research regarding military construction
(MILCON) cost estimation processes, historical cost overrun studies in MILCON and
general construction projects, and current efforts of managing MILCON cost overruns.
The chapter concludes with potential factors which cause construction cost overruns. As
stated in the previous chapter, no known published research exists specific to MILCON
cost estimating for major acquisition programs or the study of MILCON cost growth at a
programmatic level. The reviews covered in this chapter help outline the fundamental
processes and factors which lead to MILCON cost overruns within projects. These
concepts can then be applied generally toward MILCON cost growth within acquisition
programs.

MILCON Cost Estimation
U.S. Code law provides two essential definitions that prepare the premise of
MILCON cost estimates that are reported in Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR).
Military construction is defined as “any construction, development, conversion, or
extension of any kind carried out with respect to military installation, whether to satisfy
temporary or permanent requirements, or any acquisition of land or construction of a
defense access road” (10 U.S.C. §2801). SARs are mandated annual reports to Congress
for all major defense acquisition programs to include a full life-cycle cost analysis of
development, procurement, military construction, and operation and support costs (10
U.S.C. §2432).

8

According to Air Force Instruction 32-1021 (U.S. Air Force, 2016), MILCON
project development and cost estimation begins at the base civil engineer units using a
DD Form 1391 to explain and justify the project through all levels of the Air Force,
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
and Congress. Each of these forms includes the cost estimate for a single project,
ensuring the use of parametric estimating tools with historical cost data where applicable.
For the purpose of reporting MILCON cost estimates on SARs for all major defense
acquisition programs (MDAP), it is assumed that the Air Force Civil Engineer Center
(AFCEC) or the Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (IMSC) prepares the
estimate of future MILCON requirements from acquisitions outside of a DD Form 1391.
This process was unable to be verified for this study as no written guidance exists and no
point of contact was able to validate. It is recommended that the process be outlined for
standardization and public awareness. All cost estimates for MDAPs are then
coordinated with the respective acquisition program office for annual SAR reporting.
In order to receive project approval and funding appropriation, the projects
undergo a review through several offices. The DD Form 1391s are submitted from the
base to the Air Force IMSC to prioritize and validate the projects from all bases. The
consolidated list is submitted to the Air Force Facility Management Division (AF/A4CF)
who validates, prioritizes, and presents a proposed program to the Air Force Corporate
Structure (AFCS) for approval (U.S. Air Force, 2016). The AFCS consists of civilian
and military members belonging to the Air Staff, Secretariat, Core Function Lead
representatives, and the Major Commands (MAJCOM); this group provides a corporate-
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style review process when making decisions on Air Force resource allocations (Science
Applications International Corporation, 2016).
Following the AFCS review, the Air Force submits an annual MILCON budget to
OSD for review; OSD submits the MILCON program to Congress through OMB as part
of the President’s Budget in listings aggregated by country and state. The Secretary of
Defense requests authorization and appropriation from Congress for each MILCON
project submitted. After receiving appropriation and project approval, contracts may be
awarded and project funds may begin being obligated (U.S. Air Force, 2016).
Where plausible, it is beneficial to complete as much design as possible prior to
submitting to Congress for approval. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
stated that attaining 35% design to support the cost estimate in the budget submission to
Congress will increase validity (GAO, 1981). This is something that would not be
expected for cost estimates being submitted on the SARs while still in early estimation of
any actual requirements.

Cost Overruns in MILCON Projects
GAO has reported numerous studies on MILCON project processes along with
specific in depth case studies to projects of interest as early as 1958. The first GAO study
to focus on the cost estimating of MILCON projects was reported in 1981 regarding the
variability to actual costs. The latest GAO study on MILCON cost estimating was
reported in 2018 concerning the reliability of the estimates. This suggests that MILCON
cost estimates or the overruns of costs within projects has been a topic of interest for the
past 37 years. These two GAO studies analyzed the cost estimating of ongoing or
10

completed MILCON projects across the Department of Defense (DoD); all other GAO
studies focused on the construction process and efficiencies, unspecific to cost
estimating.
GAO’s 1981 report compared the budget estimate or what was estimated at the
time of requesting funds for the project to the current working estimate. The last GAO
MILCON cost estimating study in 2018 compared project appropriated funds to both
obligated funds and expended funds. Appropriated funds are what Congress and the
military service budgeted specifically for a MILCON project, obligated funds are what
has been contracted or “promised” to be paid out, and expended funds are those which
have been paid out.
The first GAO (1981) fieldwork study analyzed a broad sample of 83 MILCON
projects from fiscal years (FY) 1978-1980; these projects represented a variety of facility
types in various stages of cost overruns, cost underruns, and close to budget amounts.
They found that most projects were estimated at least 18 months prior to project bidding
for contract and that it was not unusual for the contract amount to differ from the
estimated amount that was submitted to Congress for budget. This is an important
recognition considering the MILCON costs reported in SARs are inevitably estimated
more than 18 months prior to contract bidding; a perfect estimate is nearly impossible.
Additionally, GAO found that even with the most accurate information at 100% complete
design, the actual cost is still influenced by bidding and the contractor’s economic
conditions and motivation at the time of bidding.
Utilizing the same construction activities at which GAO performed fieldwork on
the 83 projects, data was provided for a sample of 160 DoD projects from FY 1979.
11

Analysis found that 98 of 160 (61%) were being constructed for less than the budgeted
amount and 62 (39%) were experiencing cost overruns from the budget estimate when
being compared to the project’s current working estimate. Approximately 50% of all 160
projects were within 10% of the budget; 87% were within 25%. Regarding
reprogramming requests, 134 total requests were submitted to Congress during the fiscal
year of 1979, of which MILCON project cost overruns accounted for 41 (31%). Of these
41 projects, only 14 required reprogramming at congressional level because the increase
in costs exceeded 25% of the budgeted amount or $1 million, whichever was less. In
general, GAO found that cost overruns were from circumstances other than weaknesses
in DoD’s cost estimating procedures (GAO, 1981).
Concerned with constrained fiscal resources and the military’s ability to
effectively plan, estimate, and execute MILCON projects, Congress directed the
Comptroller General of the United States to review and report on DoD’s MILCON cost
estimating procedures. This mandate resulted in the 2018 GAO study, which analyzed
MILCON appropriations from FY 2005-2016 totaling $66 billion for all DoD MILCON
projects for those 11 years. By the end of FY 2016, DoD had obligated $60.9 billion
(92%) and expended $55 billion (83%). Unobligated funds still within the five-year
construction funding scope can be reprogrammed for MILCON projects needing
additional funds or returned to Congress (GAO, 2018).
Research specific to FY 2010-2016 discovered that DoD achieved $4.2 billion in
MILCON project savings of which $1.6 billion had been reprogrammed to fund
emergency projects, projects that did not receive the full requested appropriation, or
projects needing additional funding. A reprogramming example was provided; a repair
12

shop at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, received congressional authorization but was
not specifically appropriated funds for the project. Instead, the $34.4 million project was
funded through reprogrammed funds from three other funded projects in Guam.
Regarding cost overruns, GAO (2018) stated that “some differences between
initial estimates and final costs for MILCON projects can be attributed to factors outside
of DoD’s control, such as unforeseen environmental and site conditions.” A cost overrun
case study from the report was for a strategic command and control operations building at
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. The initial cost estimate in FY 2012 increased from
$564 million to $601 million (7% increase) in FY 2014 due to not appreciating the full
scope, complexity, and risk of an information technology intensive project.
GAO’s overall recommendation was for the DoD to fully incorporate necessary
steps in developing reliable cost estimates for military construction, such as the 12 steps
outlined in the GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. They found that the
DoD’s current construction guidance, the Unified Facilities Criteria, does not incorporate
all of the steps necessary to meet reliable estimate characteristics of comprehensiveness,
documentation, accuracy, and credibility. The DoD partially concurred with these
recommendations and will issue revised cost guidance in 2019 to benefit the military
construction program (GAO, 2018).
Not specific to MILCON projects or their cost overruns, Cancian (2010) takes an
interesting stance on cost growth in military acquisition programs suggesting they may be
inevitable and necessary. He proposes the term “cost discovery” instead of cost growth
when original cost estimates are updated to the cost required to produce the necessary
capability. He still deems cost growth important, claiming that accurate estimates may
13

have guided decision makers to a different decision during the analysis of alternatives.
Additionally, cost growth can act as a “tax” on acquisition programs that now have to
find internal savings to cover the growth. This is generally done through cutting
quantities, slowing development, reducing testing, or cutting support equipment; this
taxation on the program increases unit costs, disrupts production efficiencies and supply
chains, delays schedules, and could increase risk in performance and readiness. Cost
overruns in MILCON projects can exhibit the same cost discovery and taxing affect,
requiring savings from other projects, reduction in scope, or disruption of construction
causing schedule delays.

Managing MILCON Cost Overruns
There are currently two management techniques and processes that are in place
for proper MILCON cost estimation and the management of project cost overruns. The
Air Force’s first safety net is project contingency funds which is typically approximately
5% of the project cost estimate (U.S. Air Force, 2016). These funds can be used for
changes within the parameters set by AFCEC. Mandatory changes are those required to
continue construction such as unforeseen factors, criteria changes by Headquarters Air
Force, unavailability of materials, or differing site conditions. Non-mandatory changes
are usually user-requested changes; AFCEC determines if these changes are necessary to
meet the mission requirements or to remedy a safety hazard. Mandatory requested
changes over $100,000 or exceeding 75% of the available contingency funds and all nonmandatory changes will require detailed descriptions and justifications for the proposed
change along with approval by AFCEC (AFCEC, 2013).
14

The second management process is mandated by law; MILCON may not be
increased or decreased by more than 25% of the amount appropriated for the project
unless approved by the respective military service’s Secretary and Congress has been
notified (10 U.S.C. §2853). A report from the Secretary is required to notify
congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States if
any MILCON project with an authorized cost greater than $40 million has a cost increase
of 25% or more. The report will include a description of reasons for the cost increases,
the source of proposed funds to finance the increased costs, and the individuals
responsible (House Report, 2017). The DoD has supplemented this law through the
Financial Management Regulation (DoD, 2015) requiring reprogramming approval for an
increase exceeding 25% or two million dollars, whichever is less.

Causes of MILCON Cost Overruns
The construction project literature review identified as many possible factors or
causes to project cost overruns (Federe & Pigneri, 1993; Flyvberg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002;
Giegerich, 2002; GAO, 1981; Harbuck, 2004; Jahren & Ashe, 1990; Thal, Cook, &
White, 2010; Trost & Oberlender, 2003; Zentner, 1996). These articles range from 19812010 and cover a plethora of industry projects such as MILCON, transportation
infrastructure and highways, nuclear construction, and naval facilities. Table 1 outlines a
list of factors which were commonly identified in these articles as variables that can
affect construction cost overruns. Appendix B displays the full list of factors identified in
the articles, grouping them into seven general categories: bidding environment and
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contractor behavior, unforeseen changes, project features, design process, leadership,
external factors, and estimation process.

Changes in Scope/Requirements or Change Orders
Design Effort or Funds Available for Design

✓

Project/Construction Type
Supervision Effort or Management Involvement
Project Location or Site Requirements
Ratio/Difference: Low Bid to Government/Engineer Estimate

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Thal, Cook & White 2010

✓

Harbuck, 2004

✓

Trost 2003

✓

Giegerich, 2002

✓

Flyvberg 2002

Federle & Pigneri 1993

✓

Zetner 1996

Jahren & Ashe 1990

Contract Bidder Interest in Project or Number of Bids

GAO 1981

Table 1: Top Factors Affecting Construction Project Cost Overruns

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

The 1981 GAO study of MILCON projects showed that the degree of bidder
interest affected cost more than any other single factor. With several contractors
interested, competition lowers bids and with less interest in a project, bids are likely to be
higher. If a contractor truly wants a particular contract, they may be willing to alter
profits and overhead costs below original government estimation. As for fluctuations in
costs for materials and labors, uncontrollable unforeseen economic factors affected by
supply and demand can affect project costs. Any project with significant quantities of
one or more material or labor skill will be susceptible to changes in the economy at the
time of bidding (GAO, 1981).
Jahren and Ashe’s (1990) Naval facilities study found that change-order rates
directly affect cost overrun rates with the change-order rate increasing as the project size
16

increases. Their research focused on the factors influencing change orders which in turn
affect project cost overruns. Federle and Pigneri’s (1993) Iowa Department of
Transportation analysis used multiple linear regression to find statistical relationships
between the cost estimate, 11 cost variables, and the final cost overrun or underrun.
Their significant variables that shared commonality with other studies are shown in Table
1 and Appendix B.
Zetner’s (1996) study on nuclear industry construction projects identified 68
causal variables related to final cost with 80% of the top ten causal variables related
directly to the identification of the scope and the control of it thereafter. Flybverg’s
(2002) study of transportation infrastructure projects across 20 countries found that larger
projects experienced larger cost overruns based on a percentage scale. Giegerich (2002)
focused on identification of early warning signs common to construction projects that
may help “flag” those prone to future difficulties.
Trost’s (2003) multivariate regression analysis is the only literature found specific
to early estimates of construction projects. He highlighted that early estimates are
questionable due to limited scope definition leading to scope changes and lack of
accurate information available at the time of the estimate. Often the early conceptual
stage lacks a comprehensive and definitive process design with outlined site
requirements. The research identified factors which would predict the accuracy of the
early cost estimate. The most significant drivers of estimate accuracy were the basic
process design, the estimating team’s experience, accuracy of cost information, and the
time allowed to prepare the estimate.
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Harbuck (2004) categorized the root causes for project cost overruns to be design
problems, construction problems, and third-party problems. Additionally, he explained
that the nature of competitive bidding establishes incentives for contractors to be overly
optimistic in order to be the lowest bidder and win the contract at the possible expense of
not accounting for all risks. Lastly, Thal, Cook, and White (2010) created a regression
model to develop a better estimating model for MILCON contingency funds for projects.
The model included three quantifiable variables, which would assist in estimating
potential cost overruns for the project. These three variables were the design length
normalized by dividing by the design cost, initial construction cost estimate divided by
the cost at award, and the initial construction cost estimate divided by the original
programmed amount.

Summary
Though no literature exists discussing MILCON cost growths in MDAPs, the
literature reviewed regarding MILCON cost estimation, construction cost factors, and
MILCON cost overruns assists in building a framework of understanding the nature of
MILCON projects. It is important to consider the many factors that can affect cost
estimates and final project costs. All of these factors may be even more influential in
deviating from early MILCON cost estimates which are reported on SARs for acquisition
programs. Chapter III explores all available factors in relation to MILCON cost growth
at the programmatic level.
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III. Methodology
The first portion of this chapter discusses the data collected and modified to build
two databases of military construction (MILCON) costs at acquisitions programmatic
levels. The latter portion provides an outlined process of the analysis methods utilized
and tested on the databases. The two databases are (1) program MILCON data from 32
programs consisting of MILCON cost estimates from the Selected Acquisition Reports
(SAR) and (2) project MILCON data from ten programs including accumulated values
from actual projects within the programs. Analysis consists of descriptive statistics and
Fisher’s Exact tests for contingency tables. Each database utilizes both analysis methods
to answer the three research questions. Chapter IV discusses the results and implications
of the analysis.

Program MILCON Database
The majority of MILCON data for an acquisition program came from an internal
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) database of all SARs from 19662015. Though the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR)
system is the authoritative source for SARs, the system only holds automated SAR
records as of December 1997. The AFLCMC database is derived from the original SAR
sources dating back to 1966 and therefore provides more program samples for analysis.
This AFLCMC database obtained 120 Air Force-led acquisition programs with
1,330 total SAR records. This was narrowed down to 41 programs containing at least
one MILCON cost estimate, leaving 494 associated SAR records. Seven of these
acquisition programs were cancelled according to the AFLCMC database, removing 34
19

additional SAR records from analysis. Thirteen records were added from the DAMIR
system for the 34 selected programs to account for recent SAR estimates that were
submitted after the AFLCMC database was last updated with SARs from December
2015. Table 2 provides an outline of data inclusions and exclusions for this first database
used in both descriptive statistical analysis and contingency table analysis.
Table 2: Program MILCON Database Inclusions/Exclusions
Criteria
Initial SAR data provided
by AFLCMC
MILCON not reported in
any SAR for the program
Acquisition program
cancelled
Latest SARs added from
DAMIR
First to last SAR spans
less than 12 months

Δ
Programs

Δ
Reports

Total
Programs

Total
Reports

+ 120

+ 1,330

120

1,330

- 79

- 836

41

494

-7

- 59

34

435

+ 13

34

448

-4

32

444

-2

Years
Included
19962015
19662015
19662015
19662017
19662017

From the 448 records collected and formatted from the AFLCMC database and
directly input from DAMIR, two programs were excluded from analysis due to the
reporting duration from first to last SAR being less than 12 months. Final analysis was
performed on 32 programs from 444 SARs. The final 32 programs for this database are
listed in Appendix C with sanitized program names. Figure 1 displays the 32 program
commodities in a pie chart and Figure 2 displays the total years of SAR reporting for each
program.
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Figure 1: Program MILCON Database Commodity Types

Figure 2: Program MILCON Database Total Years of SAR Reporting
Data Variables
Three types of variables were derived from the 444 reports before rolling up the
data to 32 program data points. (1) A percentage value was calculated as a ratio of
MILCON cost estimate to total program cost estimate for each report. (2) MILCON cost
estimates and (3) total program cost estimates were normalized from program base years
to constant year 2018 using Military Construction (3300) factors outlined by the
Secretary of the Air Force Economics and Business Management (SAF/FMCE) (2018)
and identified in Appendix A. The USAF raw inflation index was used to change the
base year to constant year.
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The final Program MILCON Database with 444 SAR records was summarized
into 32 program records of data. Seventy-one variables were created in order to complete
cost growth analysis across the different programs. Several stages of SAR reports were
compared to the final SAR’s MILCON cost estimate to analyze growth in the form of
amounts and percentages. These growths were from the start of reporting, after a quarter
of reports have been submitted (25th percentile) , at the median point of submitted reports
(50th percentile), after three-quarters of reports have been submitted (75th percentile), at
the lowest reported cost estimate, at the highest reported cost estimate, at the average
reported cost estimate, and at the median reported cost estimate. This created eight
measurements of cost growth across Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) to be
measured in both the dollar value of cost growth and the percentage of cost growth
compared to the total program cost.
Three dummy variables were created for six of the eight cost growth percentage
target variables; these 18 dummy variables enabled contingency table tests for potential
driver factor significance. Minimum and maximum SAR values were not used for
contingency table analysis but are included in the descriptive statistical analysis. The
dummy variables for these cost growth variables were (1) a positive cost growth where
costs increased over time, (2) an absolute value cost growth of more than 1% where costs
increased or decreased over time by more than 1% of the total program cost, and (3) an
absolute value cost growth of more than 2% where costs increased or decreased over time
by more than 2% of the total program cost. Table 3 briefly lists the data variables used; a
detailed list of derived variables for the program summary dataset is outlined in
Appendix D.
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Table 3: Program MILCON Database Variables
Cost Growth Variables for
Descriptive Statistics
Growth First to Last SAR
( $ and % )
Growth 1st/2nd/3rd Quartile
Report to Last SAR
( $ and % )
Growth Average to Last SAR
( $ and % )
Growth Median to Last SAR
( $ and % )
Growth Minimum to Last SAR
( $ and %)
Growth Maximum to Last SAR
( $ and %)

Dependent Cost Growth
Variables for Contingency
Tables
Growth First to Last SAR
(positive %, >|1%| and >|2%| )
Growth 1st/2nd/3rd Quartile
Report to Last SAR
(positive %, >|1%| and >|2%| )
Growth Average to Last SAR
(positive %, >|1%| and >|2%| )
Growth Median to Last SAR
(positive %, >|1%| and >|2%| )

Independent Cost Growth
Variables for Contingency
Tables
Commodity Type
Prototype
Modification
Base Year
Average MILCON Cost to
Program Cost Ratio
MILCON Cost Estimate
on Last SAR
Total Program Estimate
on Last SAR

Project MILCON Database
From the original 32 programs under analysis, only 11 programs included SAR
estimates after 2000 when the Automated Civil Engineer System – Project Management
(ACES-PM) was fielded. Of these 11 programs, one was a satellite program and the
remaining ten were aircraft commodities consisting of various types. Specifically, the ten
represent cargo, fighter, helicopter, tanker, trainer, and unmanned aerial vehicle
programs. MILCON project data was pulled from ACES-PM with project keywords
which included these 11 programs of interest.
Program Element Codes (PEC) are mission description codes which identify the
organization entities and resources (manpower, materiel, and funds) needed for the
assigned mission (Secretary of the Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget,
2017). This would have been the ideal manner in locating projects within acquisition
programs, but they could not be used because more than just the reported PEC in the
SAR was being used for MILCON projects associated with the weapon system. The
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keyword search ensured a more encompassing scope of the projects for each program as
of 22 October 2018 when the data was pulled from ACES-PM.

Figure 3: Project MILCON Database Roll Up Process
The project data obtained from ACES-PM included contract data, contract
modification data, and project data for the 11 programs. The contract modification data
was able to roll up into the contract data and the contract data was able to roll up into the
project data. All possible variables were extracted at the lowest level to provide as many
variables at the project level which would become the foundation to roll up into
summarized program data. The final roll up to program-level is what is used in
descriptive statistical and contingency table analyses. Figure 3 graphically depicts the
roll up process.
The ACES-PM data included 224 project records with 25 variables, 214 contract
records with 14 variables, and 2,339 contract modifications with 14 variables for the 11
programs identified. Projects possessed various completion statuses; one program had
more than 85% of its projects still in the design or ready to advertise status and was
excluded from actual cost analysis. It is assumed that a program’s actual costs cannot be
determined with most projects still in phases that have no requirement for funding
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obligation yet. The final count of programs used at the project-level of analysis was ten,
as shown in Appendix C. Each of these ten programs had less than 40% of the projects
still in design or ready to advertise status. Figure 4 displays the commodity types in a pie
chart and Figure 5 graphs the total number of authorized projects per MDAP

Figure 4: Project MILCON Database Commodity Types

Figure 5: Project MILCON Database Total Projects Authorized
Contract and contract modification values were normalized from the respective
modification or contract execution fiscal year to constant year 2018. Project totals in the
form of programmed amounts, obligation amounts, and expenditure amounts were
normalized from the single appropriation fiscal year for the project to constant year 2018.
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All project values were normalized using the SAF/FMCE (2018) inflation factors from
Appendix A.
Data Variables
After the data provided by ACES-PM for contracts, contract modifications, and
projects were rolled up into ten program records, a total of 8 contract variables, 6 contract
modification variables, and 58 project variables were extracted for analysis. Appendix D
outlines the derived variables and the roll up process utilized to gain program values. To
explore different variables for the best representation of actual program MILCON costs,
programmed amounts, obligation amounts, and expenditure amounts were explored for
projects at least (1) financially closed out, (2) with construction completed, and (3) with
construction underway.
The program-level roll up from the Project MILCON Database was integrated
with the Program MILCON Database for the ten available programs to tie the SAR report
variables to the project variables and actual MILCON costs. Cost growth was analyzed
at the various stages of SAR reporting similar to the process outlined in the Program
MILCON Database variables section and outlined in Table 3. The primary difference in
this cost growth analysis is that all SAR reporting stages were compared to programmed
amounts, obligation amounts for projects with construction complete, and obligation
amounts for projects with construction at least underway instead of the last SAR cost
estimate reported. Additionally, the independent variables used for contingency table
analysis was beyond the scope of the SAR characteristics.
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Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistical analysis is used to summarize the cost growth data in both
of the databases and provide responses to Research Question One and Research Question
Three using seven measurements. The (1) mean and (2) median values of cost growth
provide a depiction of “a typical cost growth” in MILCON cost estimates. The (3)
standard deviation is a quantitative description of the variation or dispersion in the data.
The (4) minimum and (5) maximum values depict the full range of values observed for
the variable. Lastly, quartiles quantitatively provide a picture of the distribution of
values. The (6) first quartile represents the 25th percentile of cost growth values or
percentages and the (7) third quartile represents the 75th percentile.
Utilizing the first database of 32 programs, cost growth of MILCON estimates on
SARs was analyzed through descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics consisted of
the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, first quartile, median, and third
quartile. These cost growth measurements were analyzed in both dollar value and in
percentage through the various stages of SAR reports. Additionally, a scatterplot of cost
growth percentages across these 32 programs was generated to display potential data
abnormalities.
The second database with ten programs also utilized descriptive statistics to
analyze cost growth from SAR estimates to measurements of ACES-PM actual costs for
projects within programs. The same descriptive statistics were derived for this database
at both the dollar value and percentage of cost growth. The various stages of SAR report
estimates were measured against the programmed value and two separate obligation
values: (1) obligation amounts for projects with construction at least complete and (2)
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obligation amounts for projects with construction at least underway. Similarly, cost
growth for these programs was scatter plotted as a visual aid to identify potential outliers;
no programs were identified as such.

Contingency Table Analysis
Due to both databases having relatively small sample sizes, continuous variables
of cost growth in percentages were converted into categorical binary variables, or dummy
variables. Three dummy variables were created for each measurement of cost growth to
indicate (1) positive cost growth, or estimates increasing over time, (2) at least +/- 1%
cost growth, or an increase or decrease of estimates over time by at least 1%, and (3) at
least +/- 2% cost growth, or an increase or decrease of estimates over time by at least 2%.
Categorical variables can be tested for dependency through contingency tables.
Pearson’s Chi-Squared test and the Odds-Ratio test for significance may be more
common, but they require a larger sample size for the p-value approximation provided.
Fisher’s Exact test is ideal for small sample sizes and presents a conditional exact
inference. An exact inference does not rely on assumptions that parameters hold true
through infinity, but is an exact calculation of a p-value given the data presented (Agresti,
1992).
Both databases were utilized in contingency table analysis to identify potential
MILCON cost growth factors for acquisition programs. Due to the small sample size,
Fisher’s Exact test was used to test for dependency significance. The first database uses a
sample size of 32 programs with a cost growth comparing various stages of SAR
reporting to the last SAR report MILCON estimate. The second database has a smaller
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sample size of ten programs, but is able to consider cost growth from the various stages
of SAR reporting to forms of actual costs for projects from ACES-PM. Furthermore, the
second database possesses additional variable categories which were analyzed in
contingency tables against MILCON cost growth for programs.

Summary
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, both databases were prepared and
modified to extract as many possible variables and measurements of cost growth.
Descriptive statistics and contingency table analysis were the two analysis methods used
to explore answers to the research questions. The next chapter, Chapter IV, provides the
results of the descriptive statistics from the first database which aims to answer Research
Question One regarding typical cost growth in program-level MILCON cost estimates
which are reported on SARs. The chapter also provides the results of descriptive
statistics from the second database which aims to answer Research Question Three
regarding the gap between SAR reported estimates and actual project-level costs. Lastly,
Chapter IV provides the contingency table results, outlining potential factors which
showed Fisher’s Exact test significance.
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IV. Analysis Results
This chapter outlines the results and implications from the analysis methods
described in Chapter III, Methodology. First, the chapter presents the descriptive
statistical analysis results of various measurements of military construction (MILCON)
cost growth from both databases. These statistics are applied to Research Question One
and Research Question Three. Next, the chapter outlines the contingency table analysis
results measuring multiple variables against various measurements of cost growth, along
with the significant Fisher’s Exact p-values for the tests. These significant factors are
applied to Research Question Two. The chapter concludes with limitations to the data
and analysis results.

Descriptive Statistics for Program MILCON Database
Before statistical analysis was performed, a scatterplot of cost growth was
graphed for all 32 programs from the first database. Figure 6 displays cost growth as a
percentage to total acquisition program costs (y-axis) from the first Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR) cost estimate to the last SAR cost estimate for the 32 programs (x-axis).
The majority of programs (78%) show cost growth and cost savings within a 2%
difference from the original estimate or a 0% cost growth. Zero percent cost growth from
an estimate would represent a perfect estimate and though nearly impossible to
persistently achieve, it is the target percentage for this study when considering the mean
or median cost growth across programs.
Subsequent the scatterplot, typical cost growth for MILCON estimates was
analyzed using descriptive statistics from the 32 programs in the first dataset. Table 4
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outlines mean and median cost growth in dollar value and percentage from the first SAR
estimate, median SAR estimate, average SAR estimate value, and median SAR estimate
value to the last SAR estimate. Variability in the mean and median values represent both
positive and negative distribution skews throughout the phases of SAR reporting and
when observing the dollar value or percentage. Notably, the percentage of cost growth
show less skew and are used to analyze typical cost growth from cost estimates; dollar
values possess no normalization across the various types of acquisition programs but are
still useful in understanding magnitudes of potential funding impacts. Appendix E
provides full cost growth descriptive statistics at all stages of reporting for both
databases.

Figure 6: MILCON Cost Growth as Percentage to Total Program Cost from First to
Last SAR Cost Estimates
Utilizing a sample size of 32 programs and comparing estimates to the final
SAR’s MILCON cost estimate, a typical cost growth of MILCON estimates reported for
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) on SARs is relatively small in comparison
to the total program cost. Table 4’s mean and median percentages indicate that cost

31

growth percentages range from -0.16% to 0.00% of the total acquisition program cost
reported on the last SAR. Due to the mean and median percentages leaning toward
negative values, the central tendency for MILCON cost growth amongst MDAPs appears
to be cost savings.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of MILCON Cost Growth to Last SAR Estimate
(32 Programs)

First Report to Last SAR Estimate
Median Report to Last SAR Estimate
Average Value to Last SAR Estimate
Median Value to Last SAR Estimate

Mean
($M)

Median
($M)

Mean
(%)

Median
(%)

-$28.499
$8.242
-$6.182
$7.625

-$0.129
$0.000
-$0.431
$0.000

-0.11%
-0.16%
-0.14%
-0.06%

-0.03%
0.00%
-0.04%
0.00%

Descriptive Statistics for Project MILCON Database
Appendix F presents the three scatterplots of cost growth as a percentage to total
acquisition program cost reported on the last SAR (y-axis) for the ten programs (x-axis)
in the second database. Each of the programs have two data points which represent (1)
the cost growth from the first reported SAR (grey) and (2) the cost growth from last
reported SAR (black). It was anticipated that the cost growth percentages would move
inward to the 0% cost growth target line from the first SAR to the last SAR as MILCON
costs begin to actualize within the SAR cost estimates. Figure 7 presents an example of
the scatterplots in Appendix F, displaying arrows of estimates getting closer to 0% and
circling the two programs with estimates which “got worse”, or further from 0% cost
growth.
Table 5 outlines the same descriptive statistics as Table 4 with the exception of
measuring cost growth against programmed and obligated amounts derived from
accumulated actual projects instead of measuring cost growth against the last reported
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SAR estimate. The eighth listed program on the x-axis of Figure 7 has a significantly
lower programmed and obligated amount than on the reported SAR estimates which is
skewing Table 5’s means towards cost savings. This could be caused by unprogrammed
projects still needed for the future or an improperly high estimate when reporting
MILCON estimates in the SARs. Due to the small sample size of ten, this program was
not removed for analysis. For the purpose of measuring central tendency values, the
median may depict a better measurement for this dataset.

Figure 7: Example Scatterplot of MILCON Cost Growth from First and Last SAR
Estimates to Actual MILCON Costs
Utilizing programmed amounts as a measurement of actual costs as of 22 October
2018, the median cost growth percentage from SAR reports range from 0.48% to 1.05%
of the last reported total acquisition cost on a SAR. In dollar values, the median cost
growth from SAR reports to programmed actual costs ranges from $22.92 million to
$31.66 million. While the percentage of total acquisition program cost is relatively small,
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the dollar values appear significant when considering multiple acquisition programs that
may encounter these cost growths from the reported MILCON estimate on SARs.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of MILCON Cost Growth to Actual Costs
Mean
($M)

Median
($M)

Mean
(%)

Median
(%)

First Report to Programmed Amount

-$122.420

$30.394

0.43%

1.05%

Last Report to Programmed Amount

-$71.179

$31.662

0.33%

0.48%

Average Value to Programmed Amount

-$74.819

$22.915

0.28%

0.51%

-$231.938

$3.756

- 0.37%

0.10%

-$164.903

$20.346

- 0.47%

- 0.15%

-$184.337

-$5.084

- 0.51%

- 0.07%

-$198.090

$3.756

- 0.21%

0.10%

-$146.850

-$2.774

- 0.32%

- 0.03%

-$150.489

-$2.017

- 0.36%

- 0.02%

First Report to Obligated Amount
(Construction Complete)
Last Report to Obligated Amount
(Construction Complete)
Average Report to Obligated Amount
(Construction Complete)
First Report to Obligated Amount
(Construction Underway)
Last Report to Obligated Amount
(Construction Underway)
Average Report to Obligated Amount
(Construction Underway)

Both obligation amount measurements of actual costs display median central
tendencies of less cost growth and even depicting cost savings. The median cost growth
percentages from SAR reports range from -0.15% to 0.10% of the last reported total
acquisition cost on the MDAP SAR. The median dollar amount of cost growth ranges
from -$5.08 million to $20.35 million. These values may be smaller than the
programmed amount measurement because the obligation amount does not include
projects which have not begun construction yet, nor incorporate total costs for projects
with construction still underway or not completely financially closed out.
To consider the average estimating gap from SARs to actual MILCON program
costs, focus in on the average SAR estimate as the beginning value and the cumulative
programmed amount as the end value. The average SAR estimate should measure the
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accuracy of reports across the span of required reporting and the programmed amount is
more encompassing of projects for costs. Still utilizing the median as the preferred
central tendency measurement for this database, the 50th percentile reporting gap is $31.6
million in costs or 0.48% of the program’s total cost.

Contingency Table Analysis
Utilizing both the Program MILCON Database and Project MILCON Database,
dummy variables were utilized in contingency table analysis to identify potential
dependent variables which showed significance in Fisher’s Exact test with a p-value less
than 0.10. This analysis was performed using JMP Pro 13’s “Fit Y by X” function which
generates contingency tables if both variables are categorical and provides the Fisher’s
Exact test p-value and tail assignment.
A significant right tail shows that the tested cost growth is more probable if the
tested independent dummy variable is indicated with a “1” than if it is a “0”. For
example, a right tail for the “≥ 15 Years of SAR Reports” dummy variable tested against
positive cost growth tells the reader that positive cost growth is more probable if the
program has 15 or more years of SAR reports. A significant left tail shows the opposite
is more probable. For example, a left tail for the “< $10M MILCON on Last SAR”
dummy variable tested against positive cost growth tells the reader that positive cost
growth is more probable if the program has more than $10 million estimated in MILCON
on the last SAR. For the purpose of this study, all of the contingency table tests use onetailed hypotheses in order to determine directionality of the variables dependency.
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Program MILCON Database Results
The Program MILCON Database utilized 18 cost growth target dummy variables
with 19 predictor dummy variables, which were created at logical breaks of values and
percentages after observing the data in histograms. For example, the average reported
MILCON percentage in comparison to total program costs ranged from 0.02% to
15.73%. Approximately half of the programs were less than 1%, approximately a quarter
of the programs were less than 0.5%, and approximately 15% of the programs were more
than 5%. These three logical breaks of less than 0.5%, more than 1%, and more than 5%
were used for dummy variables.
The 18 by 19 dummy variables formed 342 contingency tables to be tested for
significance. Fourty-four showed significance at an alpha of 0.10 with 24 variables at an
alpha of 0.05 and four variables at an alpha of 0.01. These variables and significance
indications are shown in Appendix G; the most frequent variables from the 32 sample
programs are highlighted in Table 6. Significance measurements of p-values are marked
with asterisks (*). One asterisk indicates a significant Fisher’s Exact p-value of 0.10 or
less, two asterisks indicate a p-value of 0.05 or less, and three asterisks indicate the
highest significance with a p-value of 0.01 or less. Additionally, the right- and left-tailed
significance is marked in Table 6 to show whether the independent factor tested more
probable (right-tail) or the opposite tested more probable (left-tail).
One predictor variable with a high frequency of significance amongst the various
stages of SAR reports was cost growth for programs that had MILCON estimates
averaging more than 5% of the total program costs. All five of the significant average
MILCON % dummy variables against +/- 1% and +/- 2% cost growth were significant
36

right tails which means that cost deviation of more than 1% or 2% of the total acquisition
cost is more probable for programs averaging MILCON estimates more than 5% of the
total program cost. It can be expected that greater deviations of cost growths or savings
in comparison to total acquisition costs would occur on larger MILCON estimates with
smaller total acquisition costs.

<$50M MILCON on Last SAR

R
*

L
**
L
*

L
*

R
***
L
**
L
*

First to Last (>|1%| Growth)
R
*

First to Last (>|2%| Growth)

>$10B Total Program on Last SAR

<$10M MILCON on Last SAR

<0.5% Avg MILCON % to Total

Missile

>5% Avg MILCON % to Total

First to Last (Positive Growth)

Aircraft

Table Legend:
* p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01
L
left-tail significance
R right-tail significance

≥15 Years of Reports

Table 6: Top Significant Factors for Cost Growth to Last SAR (32 Programs)

R
*
R
*

L
***

R
**

L
**

Q1 to Last (Positive Growth)
L
**

Q1 to Last (>|1%| Growth)

R
**

Q1 to Last (>|2%| Growth)
R
***

Q2 to Last (Positive Growth)

R
*

Q2 to Last (>|1%| Growth)

R
**

Q2 to Last (>|2%| Growth)
Q3 to Last (Positive Growth)

R
**

R
*

R
**
L
*
L
*
R
**

R
*

R
**

4

7

Q3 to Last (>|1%| Growth)
Q3 to Last (>|2%| Growth)
MED to Last (Positive Growth)

R
*
R
**
R
**

R
**
R
**

MED to Last (>|1%| Growth)
MED to Last (>|2%| Growth)
AVG to Last (Positive Growth)

L
*

AVG to Last (>|1%| Growth)
AVG to Last (>|2%| Growth)
Total Significant Contingency Tables

37

3

3

5

3

3

4

The other predictor variable with the most counts of significant tests amongst
stages of SAR reports was cost growth for the aircraft commodity. The four significant
aircraft commodity tests against positive cost growth were significant right tails which
means that positive cost growth is more probable for aircraft programs than non-aircraft
programs. Two of the significant aircraft commodity tests against +/- 1% and +/-2% cost
growth were significant left tails which means that a cost deviation (growth or savings) of
more than 1% or 2% of the total acquisition cost is more probable for non-aircraft
programs than aircraft programs. This could be due to higher total acquisition costs of
aircraft programs compared to non-aircraft programs. The average total acquisition cost
for aircraft programs was $7.8 billion whereas non-aircraft programs averaged $1.6
billion. In summary, positive cost growth in MILCON estimates is more likely for
aircraft programs, but the growth is probably less than 1% of the total program cost.
Project MILCON Database Results
The Project MILCON Database utilized 21 cost growth target dummy variables
with 24 predictor dummy variables which were created at logical breaks of values and
percentages after analyzing the data values in histograms. This formed 504 contingency
tables to be tested for significance. Sixty-eight showed significance at an alpha of 0.10
with 31 testing significant at an alpha of 0.05 and nine at an alpha of 0.01. Appendix G
displays all tests’ significance and left- and right-tail values. Table 7 highlights the most
frequent significant factors of the 24 tested. Similar to Table 6, asterisks indicate the
significance.
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≥75% of Projects w/Contract Modifications

<50 Contract Modifications

<200 Contract Modifications

<$3M in Contract Modifications

<$10M in Contract Modifications

>$10B Total Program on Last SAR

<10,000 Contracted Performance Period Days

<10 Different Companies with Project Contracts

>$400M Programmed for Projects

<$50M Programmed for Projects

Table Legend:
*
p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01
L
left-tail significance
R right-tail significance

<4 Bases with Projects

Table 7: Top Significant Factors for Cost Growth to Programmed Amounts
(10 Programs)

First to Programmed (Positive Growth)
First to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)

L
*

First to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

L
***
L
*

L
***
L
*

R
*

L
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L
*

L
*

R
*
R
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L
**
L
***

L
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L
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L
*
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R
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L
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L
***

L
*

Q1 to Programmed (Positive Growth)
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L
**
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Q2 to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
Q2 to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)
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*

R
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L
*
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L
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R
*
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R
*

Q3 to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)

L
*
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R
*
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R
*
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L
*
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R
*
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L
*
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MED to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

L
*

R
*
R
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L
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L
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L
*
L
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L
*
R
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L
*

L
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L
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R
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L
*
L
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L
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R
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L
*

L
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10

9
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3

3

3

3

AVG to Programmed (Positive Growth)
AVG to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
AVG to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

L
*

Total Significant Contingency Tables

5

5
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5

3

The predictor variable which was one of the most frequently significant amongst
various stages of SAR reports tested against programmed amounts was cost growths for
programs with more than $400 million of MILCON funds programmed for projects. All
ten of these significant tests against +/- 1% and +/- 2% cost growth were significant righttails which means cost deviation of more than 1% or 2% of the total acquisition program
cost is more probable for programs that currently have more than $400 million
cumulatively programmed for MILCON projects. Perhaps a larger dollar amount
programmed for MILCON projects shows increases in planned projects’ costs or shows
that new projects were added to the mission requirement for the acquisition program,
deviating SAR estimates by more than 1% or 2% of the total program cost.
The other most significant predictor variable was cost growth for programs with
less than 10,000 cumulative performance period days contracted for projects. This
variable is a summation value from all contracts for all projects within a program,
consisting of a cumulative number of days on contract for performance periods. All ten
of these significant tests against +/- 1% and +/- 2% cost growth were significant left-tails
which means cost deviation of more than 1% or 2% of the total acquisition cost is more
probable for programs with 10,000 or more cumulative performance period days on
contracts for all projects within the program. This finding suggests that programs
requiring more performance period days cumulatively across all projects for the program
are more likely to experience changes in costs from the original SAR estimates.
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Limitations
A Research and Development (RAND) Corporation study by Hough (1992)
identified numerous limitations when using SARs for measurements of cost growth. A
few of these concerns are potential exclusion of significant cost elements, changing
guidelines for SAR preparations and the inconsistent interpretations of the guidelines
across different programs, cost sharing in joint programs, exclusion of certain classes of
major programs, an inconsistent baseline cost estimate, inaccurate inflation forecasts, and
lack of precise cost accounting when quantities change for the program. Though these
limitations exist, SARs are still deemed suitable for identifying broad trends and patterns
across various programs as long as the limitations are understood.
The largest limitation to the analysis described in this chapter is the sample size
available for program-level MILCON costs. Additionally, cost growth is best measured
against actual costs and actual costs are best displayed as expenditures. With the data
available, not all obligations were expended for the ten programs with actual project data.
Appendix C outlines the budget process statuses for these programs.
Using obligated values in lieu of expended values still has limitations as 27 of 216
projects (12.5% of projects) for the ten programs were in design phase, ready to
advertise, or open for contract bid. Minimal costs would be obligated for those projects,
perhaps only design costs if applicable. In addition to these pre-construction phases, 19
of 216 projects (8.8% of projects) for the ten programs were still in construction phase. It
is not likely and will not be assumed that all costs have been obligated for these projects.
Programmed values present an overarching program-level estimate for all projects
in all phases, but does not depict actual costs. Programmed values are more thorough and
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recent estimates for requests from Congress for appropriation and authorization to
construct projects. While technically not an actual cost, it is assumed to be a better cost
estimate from the civil engineers which can be compared to SAR estimates from program
offices.
Figure 8 graphically depicts an example program from the Project MILCON
Database to show the differences in programmed, obligated, and expended values. The
variable white line represents the MILCON estimates (y-axis) reported on each year’s
SAR (x-axis). The dotted horizontal lines depict the three possible values of actual cost
measurements for this study. For this example, the expended and obligated values
differed by approximately $3 million and are therefore nearly overlapping in the graph.

Figure 8: Example Program of MILCON Cost Estimates from SARs with Actual
Costs and Project Authorizations
Additionally, the graph in Figure 8 displays a mini-building for each MILCON
project authorized during that year of SAR reporting. The initial operational capability
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(IOC) vertical line represents the date during production when minimal operational
capabilities are met (IOC, 2018). Graphically displaying the story of this program
provides support to using the programmed amount for measurements to actual costs by
showing the potential disparity between expended or obligated amounts to the
programmed amounts given the data available for the recent ten programs with actual
projects. Furthermore, the graph connects the acquisitions estimate reporting with
operational capability and civil engineer project authorizations from Congress.
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V. Conclusion
This final chapter of the thesis utilizes the results from Chapter IV and applies
them directly to the three research questions outlined in Chapter I. Where applicable,
results are compared to findings from previous studies referenced in Chapter II. The
descriptive statistical results are unable to be compared to other studies’ quantitative
statistics due to the lack of publication for analogous military construction (MILCON)
studies in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). However, the factors
identified from contingency table analysis can be compared to previous construction
studies, unspecific to MILCON projects in MDAPs. Finally, the chapter concludes with
recommendations for future research when more automated project data is made
available for acquisition programs.

Research Questions Revisited
Research Question One
What is the typical growth in program-level MILCON cost estimates for MDAPs
led by the United States Air Force? Typical cost growth for program-level MILCON
costs estimates were analyzed from various reporting stages of Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR) to the last SAR’s reported MILCON estimate. The Program MILCON
Database with 32 programs had more sample programs for analysis, but was only able to
analyze growth to the final SAR cost estimate. Analysis showed that growth deviations
decreased over time of reportings with the average SAR estimate being $6.2 million over
the MILCON cost estimate on the last report. Using the median, the average SAR
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estimate was only $431 thousand over the MILCON estimate from the last report. This
equates to a cost savings of 0.04% of the total program cost on the last SAR report.
Considering cost growth from the first MILCON SAR estimate to the last
MILCON SAR estimate, the typical or average cost growth was -$28.5 million and the
median cost growth was -$129 thousand suggesting cost savings as the typical trend for
MILCON in MDAPs led by the Air Force. Utilizing a percentage to total program costs,
the average cost growth from first to last SAR is -0.11% of the total program cost and the
median cost growth across a program’s span of SARs is -0.03% of the total program cost.
This study analyzed many other measurements of cost growth within SAR estimates and
presented all of the descriptive statistics in Appendix E.
Research Question Two
What are the leading trends or drivers of program-level MILCON cost growth?
Due to the exploratory nature of this research and relatively small sample size of
programs, variables were tested in 846 total contingency tables. MILCON cost growth
was analyzed at various stages of SAR reportings against the final SAR report and
against actual programmed amount for all located projects for the program. Significance
of predictor variables was sought for positive cost growth, cost growth deviations greater
than +/- 1% and cost growth deviations greater than +/- 2%.
Utilizing Appendix G’s contingency table significance counts, the following five
variables may be considered leading drivers to program-level MILCON cost growth.
First, aircraft commodities tend to drive positive cost growth for MILCON projects but
not more than 1% of the total program cost. Second, a higher average percentage of
MILCON cost estimates reported on SARs for a program compared to the total program
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cost estimate can drive cost growth or savings by more than 1% or 2% of the total
program cost. Third, more funds cumulatively programmed for projects within a
program may drive cost growth or savings by more than 1% or 2% of the total program
cost. Fourth, higher cumulative performance period days on contracts across all projects
within a program may indicate cost growth or savings by more than 1% or 2% of the total
program cost. Lastly, more companies contracted for projects within a program may
drive cost growth or savings by more than 1% or 2% of the total program cost.
Several other factors tested significant and should be considered possible drivers
to MILCON cost growth in MDAPs. The number of bases authorized for projects within
a program, the number of contract modifications, and the monetary value of contract
modifications may affect the size of cost growth in comparison to total program costs.
Additionally, the number of years between the first and last MILCON SAR estimate and
the percentage of projects with contract modifications may drive positive cost growth.
Given the data available for MILCON projects from the Automated Civil
Engineer System – Project Management (ACES-PM) for MDAPs, most of the factors
outlined by previous studies were not available for analysis. Examples of these
unobtained factors are the number of bids for the projects, the difference in the lowest bid
to the government’s estimate, changes in project schedule, the design process or effort,
the economics and politics surrounding the project, and the involvement of leadership in
the design, estimating, or construction process.
Four of the previously studied factors share commonalities with the findings of
this thesis. (1) Federle & Pigneri (1993) found that the duration of the construction
project can affect cost overruns for the project. We found that the cumulative total of
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contracted performance period days was significant with regards to cost growth at the
programmatic level of MILCON. (2) Four studies from Table 1 in Chapter II’s literature
review showed that the type of project or construction affected the cost overrun of the
project. This study found that MILCON projects for aircraft acquisition programs were
more probable to see cost growth than the non-aircraft MDAPs when testing at the
programmatic level. (3) Table 1 also showed five studies which found changes in
requirements or the presence of change orders to be an indication of cost overruns in
construction projects. This study found both the monetary value and the number of
contract modifications tested significant for MILCON in acquisition programs. Lastly,
(4) three studies from the literature review reported the location of projects to affect cost
overruns. Looking at projects cumulatively for programs makes this factor unique; the
number of different locations required for the program tested significant as well as
whether or not locations were located outside of the continental United States
(OCONUS). Table 9 revisits the shared factors from the literature review’s Table 1 and
Appendix B.

Project Location or Site Requirements

✓
✓
✓

Construction Duration/Length
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✓

✓

Harbuck 2004

Trost 2003

Giegerich, 2002

Flyvberg 2002
✓

✓

✓
✓

Angell, et al. 2019

✓

Zetner 1996

✓

Federle & Pigneri 1993

✓

Thal, Cook & White 2010

Project/Construction Type

Jahren & Ashe 1990

Changes in Scope/Requirements or Change Orders

GAO 1981

Table 8: Revisited Factors Affecting Construction Project Cost Overruns

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

Research Question Three
The Project MILCON Database with ten programs had considerably less sample
programs than the first database, but allowed analysis of actual cost growth from projects
that have been completed or at minimum have been authorized for programming as of 22
October 2018. With various MILCON requirements for different programs and
commodities, dollar values varied greatly across programs. For the purpose of analyzing
the gap between cost estimates on the SARs and actual costs from projects, percentages
of cost growth were used. Zero percent cost growth suggests perfect estimation with no
gap between SAR reportings and actual costs.
Analyzing the median cost growth percentage from all stages of SAR reporting to
the current programmed amount, results range from 0.39% to 1.05% of the total program
cost. This suggests that the SAR estimates were slightly underestimated to what has been
programmed for projects within the acquisition program. The median cost growth
percentages to the current obligation amounts range from -0.37% to 0.10% of the total
program cost. This proposes that the SAR estimates are generally closer to what has been
already obligated on projects and could remain more accurate if no other obligations were
made toward the programmed amounts. This course of action is highly unlikely.

Future Research
Utilizing the potential variable drivers identified in this thesis and additional
program record samples as future data becomes available, a prediction model can be
explored to provide decision makers and analysts with additional tools for MILCON cost
estimating in early phases of concept. The prediction model could be in the form of a
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decision tree to predict either the actual amount of program MILCON costs or the
accuracy of the SAR estimates based on predictor variables available. The amount of
MILCON costs could be determined by a dollar value or as a percentage of the total
program costs. The accuracy of the SAR MILCON cost estimate could be determined
by predicting the cost growth of the estimate. Logistic regression could also explore
these predictions.
Previous Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports of MILCON project
costs analyzed cost overruns through case study analysis. A similar style analysis could
be applied at a programmatic level by analyzing specific performance and cost growths
for projects within a few program case studies. Specific SARs and DD Form 1391s could
be analyzed for those programs to identify more specific causes to cost growth amongst
MDAP MILCON projects and for the program cumulatively.

Final Thoughts
This thesis was exploratory in nature as a topic with no published empirical
studies. With numerous published studies regarding MILCON project overruns and
general construction overrun factors, MILCON cost growth for Air Force MDAPs has yet
to be analyzed in a published forum. Though only able to utilize a small sample size of
acquisition programs, this study found typical MILCON cost growth to be negative
indicating more cost savings than cost growth across SAR MILCON estimates. The
savings is typically less than 0.2% of the total program cost implying minimal impact to
MDAP decisions regarding the weapon system as a whole.
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The early MILCON estimates from SARs compared to current programmed or
obligated values for projects show a gap in estimating on the SAR reports. Though
estimates got more accurate from the first SAR to the last SAR for most programs, Table
5 from Chapter IV shows the last SAR’s median MILCON cost estimate was
approximately $31 million underestimated to projects currently authorized and
appropriated for the programs. Though the median cost growth percentage from last
SAR to programmed amount is only 0.48% of the total acquisition program’s cost, the
dollar value can add up and impact budgetary decisions of scarce resources.
Lastly, several factors tested significant as potential drivers to MILCON cost
growth for acquisition programs. Unfortunately with the programs available for analysis,
a prediction model cannot be built with these factors in order to take cost estimating
action when preparing SAR estimates. Further research and program data points are
needed to build this model. At this time, it is advantageous for program offices and
decision makers to recognize the potential driver factors within their acquisition program
and generally prepare for changes in MILCON costs as the program matures.
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Appendix A
Table A1: DoD Acquisition Category Tresholds
Acquisition
Category
ACAT I
(MDAP)

ACAT IA
(MAIS)

ACAT II
ACAT III
ACAT IV

Threshold Designations
(in Fiscal Year 2014 constant dollars)
- Total RDT&E costs > $480 million or
- Total Procurement costs > $2.79 billion or
- Designated by milestone decision authority as special interest
Specific to Automated Information Systems
- Total program costs > $40 million in any single Fiscal Year or
- Total program costs > $165 million through system deployment or
- Total program costs > $520 million through system lifecycle or
- Designated by milestone decision authority as special interest
- Total RDT&E costs > $185 million and < $480 million or
- Total Procurement costs > $835 million and < $2.79 billion
- Total RDT&E costs < $185 million and
- Total Procurement costs < $835 million
Specific to Navy and Marine Corps only

Table A2: Inflation Factors Used for Normalization
From BY
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

CY 18
Factor
0.150338
0.154397
0.159338
0.165074
0.172832
0.182338
0.191637
0.200453
0.209273
0.225596
0.249960
0.267208
0.285378
0.304783
0.334043
0.368783
0.412668
0.450634
0.472715
0.490678
0.507361

CY 18
Factor
0.521567
0.535649
0.551719
0.574891
0.597887
0.623596
0.641057
0.658365
0.671532
0.684292
0.697977
0.712635
0.717623
0.723364
0.733491
0.746694
0.752668
0.760194
0.775398
0.797110
0.821820

From BY
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
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From BY
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027

CY 18
Factor
0.844009
0.864265
0.877229
0.884247
0.901932
0.918167
0.931939
0.945918
0.956323
0.967799
0.984252
1.000000
1.017000
1.036323
1.057049
1.078190
1.099754
1.121749
1.144184
1.167068
1.190409

Appendix B

Changes in Scope/Requirements or Change Orders
Changes in Schedule or Delays
Changes in Anticipated Bid Opening Date
Changes in Site Location

✓

Contract Bidder Interest in Project or Number of Bids
Ratio/Difference: Low Bid to Government/Engineer Estimate
Contractor History or Unsatisfactory Performance
Disputes or Claims
Bid Range: Highest to Lowest Bid

Design Process

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

Changes, Errors, or Ambiguity in Design
Design Effort or Funds Available for Design
Design Complexity
Design Length

External Factors

✓
✓
✓

Project Features

✓

✓

Estimation Process

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

Cost Information Available
Estimator Team Experience
Estimate Effort or Time Allowed to Prepare Estimate
✓
✓

Improper Scope Definition
Lack of Estimate Accountability

Strategic Misrepresentation
Supervision Effort/Management Involvement

✓
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✓

✓

✓

Thal, Cook & White 2010
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

Leadership

Harbuck, 2004
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

Construction Type
Location or Site Requirements
Size
Construction Duration/Length

✓

✓
✓

✓

Fluctuations in Labor/Material Costs or Economics
Local Government/Permitting Agencies or Politics

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓

Trost 2003

✓
✓

✓
✓

Bidding Environment and Contractor Behavior

Giegerich, 2002

Flyvberg 2002

✓

Zetner 1996

✓

Federle & Pigneri 1993

Jahren & Ashe 1990

Unforeseen Changes

GAO 1981

Table B1: Factors Affecting Construction Project Cost Overruns

✓

✓
✓

Appendix C
Table C1: 32 Programs Included in Program MILCON Database

Program 1
Program 2
Program 3
Program 4
Program 5
Program 6
Program 7
Program 9
Program 10
Program 12
Program 13
Program 14
Program 15
Program 16
Program 19
Program 20
Program 21
Program 22
Program 23
Program 25
Program 28
Program 29
Program 30
Program 31
Program 32
Program 33
Program 34
Program 36
Program 38
Program 39
Program 40
Program 41

Weapon System
Type
Missile
Launch Vehicle
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
Missile
Missile
Aircraft
Satellite
Aircraft
Satellite
Satellite
Launch Vehicle
Missile
Launch Vehicle
Aircraft
Aircraft
Launch Vehicle
Aircraft
Aircraft
Electronic
Electronic
Aircraft
Aircraft
Satellite
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
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Total Years
Reported
9
11
7
7
10
9
12
9
14
7
16
14
11
9
9
26
19
17
25
10
8
23
21
22
22
16
14
10
9
8
7
4

Final SAR?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Table C2: 10 Programs Included in Project MILCON Database

16 Years

8

100.00%

100.00%

89.96%

97.90%

95.64%

58

90.26%

26

100.00%

Aircraft

97.92%

Program 20

8

15 Years

110.10%

48

110.10%

25

100.00%

Aircraft

100.00%

Program 23

2

11 Years

57.99%

2

55.65%

21

86.96%

Aircraft

65.22%

Program 30

6

7 Years

30.38%

23

31.69%

22

75.00%

Aircraft

75.00%

Program 31

2

5 Years

112.40%

4

112.40%

22

100.00%

Satellite

100.00%

Program 32

1

9 Years

89.79%

1

89.70%

16

100.00%

Aircraft

100.00%

Program 33

3

41.24%

2 Years

39.97%

10

76.47%

52.39%

14

58.82%

44.22%

Aircraft

4

63.83%

Program 34
Program 39

Aircraft

1 Year

44.68%

45.63%

17

5

34.51%

8

Program 40

Aircraft

Aircraft

Program 41

3 Years

66.67%

% Obligations of
Programmed

47

50.00%

% Expenditures of
Programmed

7

3

% Projects Underway
+ Complete

Total Projects

- 11 Years

% Projects Complete

Total Years Reported

6

Total Bases

4

First Project Date
(After First SAR)

Commodity
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Appendix D
Table D1: Variables from Summarized Program MILCON Data for
Cost Growth Analysis (Both Databases)
Database Database
1
2
32 Prgms 10 Prgms

Variable
[DV] = Dummy Variable

De scriptive
Statistics
Use

Continge ncy
Table Use

Type

De scription

Cost Estimate Variables
MILCON cost estimate value from first reported SAR in
FY18 unit of millions
Using =QUART ILE.EXC(array,1) in Excel, SAR month was
rounded up to actual SAR report; MILCON cost estimate for
report representing 25th percentile of reports for program

X

X

First SAR MILCON Estimate

Continuous

X

X

1st Quartile SAR MILCON
Estimate

Continuous

X

X

2nd Quartile SAR MILCON
Estimate

Continuous

Using =QUART ILE.EXC(array,2) in Excel, SAR month was
rounded up to actual SAR report; MILCON cost estimate for
report representing 50th percentile of reports for program

X

X

3rd Quartile SAR MILCON
Estimate

Continuous

Using =QUART ILE.EXC(array,3) in Excel, SAR month was
rounded up to actual SAR report; MILCON cost estimate for
report representing 75th percentile of reports for program

X

X

Average SAR MILCON Estimate

Continuous

X

X

Median SAR MILCON Estimate

Continuous

Minimum SAR MILCON
Estimate
Maximum SAR MILCON
Estimate

X

X

X

X

X

X

Last SAR MILCON Estimate

X

X

X

X

X

X

[DV] x2 Last SAR MILCON
Independent
Binary
Last SAR T otal Program
Continuous
Estimate
[DV] x2 Last SAR T otal
Independent
Binary
DV for program cost estimate of > $1B and > $10B
Program
T otal Programmed Funds for
Summation value of programmed funds for all projects within
Continuous
Projects
a program in Fiscal Year 2018 unit of millions
[DV] x2 T otal Programmed
DV for value of total programmed funds for all listed projects
Independent
Binary
Funds
< $50M and >$400M
Cost Growth Variables (Measured to Last SAR MILCON Estimate)
Growth First to Last SAR
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by first MILCON estimate
Continuous
$
Amount
in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
T otal growth from first to last MILCON estimates divided by
Average Growth per Year
Continuous
total years between reports
T otal growth from first to last MILCON estimates divided by
Growth First to Last SAR Percent
%
Percentage
last reported total program estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
[DV] x3 Growth First to Last
Dependent
Binary
cost growth
Growth 1st Quartile to Last SAR
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by 1st quartile MILCON
$
Continuous
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
Amount
Growth 1st Quartile to Last SAR
T otal growth from 1st quartile report to last MILCON
%
Percentage
Percentage
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
[DV] x3 Growth 1st Quartile to
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
Dependent
Binary
Last
cost growth
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by 2nd quartile MILCON
Growth 2nd Quartile to Last SAR
$
Continuous
Amount
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
Growth 2nd Quartile to Last SAR
T otal growth from 2nd quartile report to last MILCON
%
Percentage
Percentage
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
[DV] x3 Growth 2nd Quartile
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
Dependent
Binary
to Last
cost growth
Growth 3rd Quartile to Last SAR
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by 3rd quartile MILCON
$
Continuous
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
Amount
Growth 3rd Quartile to Last SAR
T otal growth from 3rd quartile report to last MILCON
%
Percentage
Percentage
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
[DV] x3 Growth 3rd Quartile to
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
Dependent
Binary
Last
cost growth

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Continuous

Using =AVERAGE(array) in Excel, average MILCON cost
estimate was identified for program
Using =MEDIAN(array) in Excel, median MILCON cost
estimate was identified for program
Using =MIN(array) in Excel, minimum MILCON cost
estimate was identified for program
Using =MAX(array) in Excel, maximum MILCON cost
estimate was identified for program
MILCON cost estimate value from last reported SAR in
FY18 unit of millions
DV for MILCON cost estimate of < $10M and < $50M
T otal program cost estimate value from last reported SAR in
FY18 unit of millions

Continuous
Continuous
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Database Database
1
2
32 Prgms 10 Prgms

Variable
[DV] = Dummy Variable

De scriptive
Statistics
Use

Continge ncy
Table Use

Type

Growth Average to Last SAR
Amount

$

Continuous

X

Growth 1st Quartile SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage

%

Percentage

X

[DV] x3 Growth 1st Quartile to
Programmed

X

Growth 2nd Quartile SAR to
Programmed Funds Amount

$

Continuous

X

Growth 2nd Quartile SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage

%

Percentage

X

[DV] x3 Growth 2nd Quartile
to Programmed

X

Growth 3rd Quartile SAR to
Programmed Funds Amount

$

Continuous

X

Growth 3rd Quartile SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage

%

Percentage

X

[DV] x3 Growth 3rd Quartile to
Programmed

X

Growth Last SAR to Programmed
Funds Amount

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X

De scription

Last MILCON estimate subtracted by average MILCON
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
T otal growth from average estimate of reports to last
Growth Average to Last SAR
%
Percentage MILCON estimate divided by last reported total program
Percentage
estimate
[DV] x3 Growth Avergae to
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
Dependent
Binary
Last
cost growth
Growth Median to Last SAR
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by median MILCON
$
Continuous
Amount
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
T otal growth from median estimate of reports to last
Growth Median to Last SAR
%
Percentage MILCON estimate divided by last reported total program
Percentage
estimate
[DV] x3 Growth Median to
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
Dependent
Binary
Last
cost growth
Growth Minimum to Last SAR
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by minimum MILCON
$
Continuous
Amount
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
T otal growth from minimum estimate of reports to last
Growth Minimum to Last SAR
%
Percentage MILCON estimate divided by last reported total program
Percent
estimate
Growth Maximum to Last SAR
Last MILCON estimate subtracted by maximum MILCON
$
Continuous
Amount
estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost savings
T otal growth from maximum estimate of reports to last
Growth Maximum to Last SAR
%
Percentage MILCON estimate divided by last reported total program
Percentage
estimate
Cost Growth Variables (Measured to Project Programmed Funds)
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by first SAR
Growth First SAR to Programmed
$
Continuous MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost
Funds Amount
savings
Growth 1st SAR to Programmed
T otal growth from first SAR to programmed MILCON
%
Percentage
Funds Percentage
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
[DV] x3 Growth First to
Dependent
Binary
cost growth
Programmed
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by 1st quartile
Growth 1st Quartile SAR to
$
Continuous SAR MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is
Programmed Funds Amount
cost savings

Growth Last SAR to Programmed
Funds Percentage
[DV] x3 Growth Last to
Programmed
Growth Average SAR to
Programmed Funds Amount
Growth Average SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage
[DV] x3 Growth Average to
Programmed

Dependent

Dependent

Dependent

Binary

Binary

Binary

$

Continuous

%

Percentage
Dependent

Binary

$

Continuous

%

Percentage
Dependent
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Binary

T otal growth from 1st quartile SAR to programmed MILCON
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
cost growth
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by 2nd quartile
SAR MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is
cost savings
T otal growth from 2nd quartile SAR to programmed
MILCON estimate divided by last reported total program
estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
cost growth
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by 3rd quartile
SAR MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is
cost savings
T otal growth from 3rd quartile SAR to programmed
MILCON estimate divided by last reported total program
estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
cost growth
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by last SAR
MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost
savings
T otal growth from last SAR to programmed MILCON
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
cost growth
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by average SAR
MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost
savings
T otal growth from average SAR to programmed MILCON
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
cost growth

Database Database
1
2
32 Prgms 10 Prgms
X
X
X

X

Growth Median SAR to
Programmed Funds Amount
Growth Median SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage
[DV] x3 Growth Median to
Programmed

Type

$

Continuous

%

Percentage
Dependent

Binary

De scription
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by median SAR
MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost
savings
T otal growth from median SAR to programmed MILCON
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate
DV for positive cost growth, >|1%| cost growth, and >|2%|
cost growth
Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by minimum SAR
MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost
savings

$

Continuous

X

Growth Minimum SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage

%

Percentage

T otal growth from minimum SAR to programmed MILCON
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate

X

Growth Maximum SAR to
Programmed Funds Amount

$

Continuous

Programmed MILCON estimate subtracted by maximum SAR
MILCON estimate in unit of millions; negative growth is cost
savings

X

Growth Maximum SAR to
Programmed Funds Percentage

%

Percentage

T otal growth from maximum SAR to programmed MILCON
estimate divided by last reported total program estimate

X

(x 9) Same Growth Measurements
to Obligated Funds (Construction
Complete) Amount

$

Obligated MILCON estimate (for projects with construction
complete or financially closed out) subtracted by various SAR
MILCON estimate in unit of millions

X

(x 9) Same Growth Measurements
to Obligated Funds (Construction
Complete) Percentage

%

T otal growth from various SAR estimates to obligated
MILCON estimate (for projects with construction complete
or financially closed out) divided by last reported total
program estimate

X

(x 9) Same Growth Measurements
to Obligated Funds (Construction
Underway) Amount

$

Obligated MILCON estimate (for projects with construction
underway or complete or financially closed out) subtracted by
various SAR MILCON estimate in unit of millions

X

(x 9) Same Growth Measurements
to Obligated Funds (Construction
Underway) Percentage

%

T otal growth from various SAR estimates to obligated
MILCON estimate (for projects with construction underway
or complete or financially closed out) divided by last reported
total program estimate

X

Commodity
[DV] x5 Commodity

X
X

T otal Years of SARs Reporting

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

[DV] x3 Years of Reports
First SAR MILCON Cost to
Program Cost Ratio
Last SAR MILCON Cost to
Program Cost Ratio
Average MILCON Cost to
Program Cost Ratio
[DV] x3 Average MILCON
Cost to Program Cost
[DV] All Reports Not Verified in
DAMIR

X
X
X

X
X

Continge ncy
Table Use

Growth Minimum SAR to
Programmed Funds Amount

[DV] Prototype
[DV] Modification
Base Year
[DV] x2 Base Year
[DV] x1 Base Year

X

De scriptive
Statistics
Use

X

X
X
X
X
X

Variable
[DV] = Dummy Variable

X
X
X

Program Variables
Categorical
Independent

Binary

Independent
Independent

Binary
Binary
Interval
Binary
Binary

T ype of MDAP weapon system
DV for aircraft, electronic, launch vehicle, missile, and
satellite commodity
Did MDAP have a prototype developed?
Was MDAP a modification program?
First base year used for values reported on SAR
DV for base year 1960-1979 and base year 1980-1999
DV for base year ≥ 2000

Interval

Last SAR reported year subtracted by first SAR reported year

Binary

DV for < 5 years, < 10 years, and ≥ 15 years
First SAR's MILCON estimate divided by total program costs
from first SAR
Last SAR's MILCON estimate divided by total program costs
from last SAR
Average percent of MILCON costs divided by total program
costs from all reported SARs
DV for < 0.5%, > 1%, and > 5% MILCON to total program
costs
Were any program SARs from years prior to 1997 and
therefore not verified in DAMIR?
Summation value of projects located in ACES-PM with
keyword search of the program
DV for programs with < 10 projects
T he fiscal year of the oldest project found for the program in
ACES-PM
T he fiscal year of the newest project found for the program
in ACES-PM
T he amount of different bases which had projects listed in
ACES-PM for the program
DV for programs with projects at < 4 different bases
T he amount of different overseas bases which had projects
listed in ACES-PM for the program
Were any projects for the program listed for an overseas
base?
Summation value of overseas projects located in ACES-PM
with keyword search of the program

Independent
Independent

Independent

Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Independent

Binary

T otal Projects
[DV] T otal Projects

Binary

Continuous
Independent

Binary

X

Oldest Project Fiscal Year

Interval

X

Newest Project Fiscal Year

Interval

X

Number of Bases

X

[DV] Number of Bases

X

Number of OCONUS Bases

X
X

[DV] OCONUS Bases

Continuous
Independent

Binary
Continuous

Independent

Number of OCONUS Projects

Binary
Continuous
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Database Database
1
2
32 Prgms 10 Prgms

Variable
[DV] = Dummy Variable

De scriptive
Statistics
Use

Continge ncy
Table Use

Type

X

Number of Projects in Stages (x5)

Continuous

X

Percent of Projects in DSG or
BID/RT A Stage

Percentage

X

Number of T otal Contracts

Continuous

X

Number of Different Contractor
Companies for Projects

Continuous

X
X
X
X

[DV] Different Contractor
Companies
Oldest Contract Award
Newest Contract Award
T otal Performance Period Days
Contracted

X

[DV] x2 Performance Period
Days on Contract

X

T otal Contract Award Amount

X
X
X
X

Number of Projects with
Contract Modification
Number of Contracts with
Modifications
Number of Contract
Modifications
[DV] x2 Contract
Modifications

Independent

Binary
Interval
Interval
Continuous

Independent

Binary
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

Independent

Binary

X

First Contract Modification

Interval

X

Last Contract Modification

Interval

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

T otal Contract Modifications
Amount
[DV] Contract Modifications
Amount
T otal Contract and Modification
Amount
Percent of Projects with
Contract Modifications
[DV] Percent of Projects with
Contract Modifications
Percent of Contracts with
Modifications
[DV] Percent of Contracts with
Modifications

Continuous
Independent

Binary
Continuous
Percentage

Independent

Binary
Percentage

Independent
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Binary

De scription
Summation value of projects in various stages of completion:
financial and project closeout complete (HIS), construction
complete (CMP), construction underway (CNS), design in
progress (DSG), bid open/contractor selection in
progress/ready to advertise (BID/RT A)
T he number of projects still in design or bidding/ready to
advertise stage divided by total projects for the program
Summation value of total contracts awarded for all listed
projects within a program
Number of different/separate contractor companies who were
awarded a contract for all listed projects within a program
DV for < 10 different contractor companies awarded
contracts for projects within program
Date of oldest contract award for project within program
Date of newest contract award for project within program
Summation value of performance period days on contract for
all projects within program; modifications not included
DV for summation of performance period days on contract
for all projects within program at < 5,000 days and <10,000
days
Summation value of all contract awards for projects within
program in Fiscal Year 2018 unit of millions
Number of projects within program that have at least one
contract modification reported
Number of contracts within program that have at least one
modification reported
Number of contract modifications reported for projects
within program
DV for < 50 and < 200 contract modifications within a single
program for all projects listed
Date of first reported contract modification for project
within program
Date of latest reported contract modification for project
within program
Summation value of all contract modifications reported for
all projects within program
DV for < $10M and < $3M total in contract modifications
for projects within program
Summation value of contract awards plus contract
modifications for all projects within program
Number of projects with contract modifications divided by
total number of projects for program
DV for < 75% of projects within program reporting at least
one contract modification
Number of contracts with modifications divided by total
number of contracts for program
DV for < 75% of contracts within program reporting at least
one modification

Appendix E
KEY
≤ 0.5% (Bes t)
≤ 1.0% (Better)
≤ 2.0% (Good)

Table E1: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Last SAR in Percentage (32 Programs)

Q3 to Last SAR

AVG to Last SAR

MED to Last SAR

-0.07%
1.64%
6.69%
0.14%
-0.02%
-0.48%
-3.09%

-0.16%
0.97%
1.35%
0.04%
0.00%
-0.04%
-4.44%

-0.24%
0.73%
0.31%
0.00%
0.00%
-0.01%
-2.85%

-0.14%
0.52%
0.84%
0.02%
-0.04%
-0.21%
-1.87%

-0.06%
0.64%
1.20%
0.01%
0.00%
-0.03%
-2.30%

0.62%
1.28%
6.69%
0.90%
0.09%
0.00%
0.00%

MAX to Last SAR

Q2 to Last SAR

-0.11%
1.62%
5.39%
0.90%
-0.03%
-1.04%
-3.21%

MIN to Last SAR

Q1 to Last SAR

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

First to Last SAR

% of Cos t Growth to Tota l Progra m Cos t

-0.99%
1.20%
0.00%
-0.07%
-0.46%
-1.99%
-4.44%

Table E2: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Last SAR in Dollar Value (32 Programs)

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

-$28.50
$177.16
$207.06
$14.88
-$0.13
-$14.19
-$859.77

-$24.34
$132.72
$131.77
$3.59
-$0.11
-$10.53
-$633.47

$8.24
$34.77
$139.05
$1.63
$0.00
-$1.54
-$35.58

-$2.51
$20.56
$70.74
$0.00
$0.00
-$0.05
-$76.75
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-$6.18
$52.58
$108.59
$0.44
-$0.43
-$3.49
-$217.17

$7.63
$32.19
$122.96
$0.12
$0.00
-$0.64
-$35.58

$30.86
$62.31
$238.61
$30.35
$1.14
$0.01
$0.00

MAX to Last SAR

MIN to Last SAR

MED to Last SAR

AVG to Last SAR

Q3 to Last SAR

Q2 to Last SAR

Q1 to Last SAR

First to Last SAR

$ Amounts of Cos t Growth

-$56.54
$161.85
$0.00
-$0.64
-$10.36
-$27.64
-$859.77

Table E3: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Programmed Funds in Percentage
(10 Programs)

Q1 to Programmed

Q2 to Programmed

Q3 to Programmed

Last to Programmed

AVG to Programmed

MED to Programmed

MIN to Programmed

MAX to Programmed

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

First to Programmed

% of Cos t Growth to Tota l Progra m Cos t

0.43%
2.81%
3.12%
2.50%
1.05%
-0.46%
-6.23%

0.27%
2.39%
2.92%
2.07%
0.41%
-0.52%
-5.63%

0.41%
1.85%
2.86%
1.65%
0.39%
-0.15%
-3.92%

0.05%
1.99%
2.10%
1.58%
0.47%
-0.65%
-4.17%

0.33%
2.10%
3.67%
1.69%
0.48%
-0.47%
-3.96%

0.28%
2.05%
2.63%
1.87%
0.51%
-0.56%
-4.54%

0.39%
1.86%
2.86%
1.63%
0.42%
-0.16%
-3.96%

1.07%
2.04%
3.67%
2.66%
1.10%
0.12%
-3.34%

-0.46%
2.51%
1.95%
1.49%
0.30%
-2.12%
-6.23%

Table E4: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Programmed Funds in Dollar Value
(10 Programs)

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

MAX to Programmed

MIN to Programmed

MED to Programmed

AVG to Programmed

Last to Programmed

Q3 to Programmed

Q2 to Programmed

Q1 to Programmed

First to Programmed

$ Amounts of Cos t Growth

-$122.42 -$105.97
-$40.62
-$76.18
-$71.18
-$74.82
-$44.96
$14.65 -$190.18
$820.41
$738.28
$540.36
$605.02
$543.98
$492.45
$781.50
$551.41
$521.11
$564.85
$478.72
$496.85
$428.53
$357.79
$466.39
$479.45
$564.85
$357.79
$174.66
$238.62
$112.95
$236.53
$229.00
$173.41
$126.21
$120.99
$173.90
$30.39
$21.52
$20.35
$22.38
$31.66
$22.92
$20.92
$40.35
$15.50
-$52.21
-$28.52
-$4.92
-$19.14
-$13.92
-$34.69
-$4.48
$4.56 -$113.56
-$2,364.35 -$2,138.06 -$1,485.87 -$1,581.33 -$1,504.59 -$1,721.76 -$1,504.59 -$1,265.98 -$2,364.35
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Table E5: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Obligated Funds in Percentage
(10 Programs - Construction Complete)

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

-0.37%
3.18%
2.97%
1.76%
0.10%
-0.93%
-8.03%

-0.53%
2.77%
2.77%
1.06%
-0.03%
-1.26%
-7.43%

-0.39%
2.24%
2.71%
0.72%
-0.15%
-1.11%
-5.71%

-0.75%
2.27%
1.95%
0.81%
-0.37%
-1.53%
-5.96%

-0.47%
2.19%
1.88%
1.17%
-0.15%
-1.34%
-5.76%

-0.51%
2.40%
2.49%
0.87%
-0.07%
-1.22%
-6.33%

-0.41%
2.25%
2.71%
0.74%
-0.13%
-1.13%
-5.76%

0.27%
2.26%
3.03%
1.84%
0.47%
-0.39%
-5.13%

MAX to Obligated:
Construction Complete

MIN to Obligated:
Construction Complete

MED to Obligated:
Construction Complete

AVG to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Last to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Q3 to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Q2 to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Q1 to Obligated:
Construction Complete

First to Obligated:
Construction Complete

% of Cos t Growth to Tota l Progra m Cos t

-1.26%
2.85%
1.80%
0.54%
-0.44%
-2.81%
-8.03%

Table E6: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Obligated Funds in Dollar Value
(10 Programs - Construction Complete)

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

MAX to Obligated:
Construction Complete

MIN to Obligated:
Construction Complete

MED to Obligated:
Construction Complete

AVG to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Last to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Q3 to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Q2 to Obligated:
Construction Complete

Q1 to Obligated:
Construction Complete

First to Obligated:
Construction Complete

$ Amounts of Cos t Growth

-$231.94 -$215.49 -$150.03 -$185.69 -$164.90 -$184.34 -$154.48
-$94.87 -$299.70
$1,018.72
$935.73
$733.96
$801.50
$738.16
$682.54
$982.52
$747.30
$722.72
$505.48
$419.34
$437.47
$369.15
$298.42
$407.01
$420.07
$505.48
$298.42
$115.25
$182.42
$77.98
$176.20
$149.22
$113.55
$94.36
$111.72
$115.45
$3.76
-$2.77
-$11.00
-$20.08
$20.35
-$5.08
-$9.53
$11.66
-$20.15
-$99.40
-$65.61
-$46.48
-$91.46
-$60.48
-$71.78
-$51.10
-$39.27 -$150.65
-$3,046.91 -$2,820.62 -$2,168.43 -$2,263.89 -$2,187.15 -$2,404.32 -$2,187.15 -$1,948.54 -$3,046.91
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Table E7: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Obligated Funds in Percentage
(10 Programs - Construction Underway)

Mea n
Std Dev
Ma x
3rd Qua rti l e
Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

-0.21%
3.04%
2.97%
1.82%
0.10%
-0.81%
-7.42%

-0.38%
2.64%
2.77%
1.41%
0.02%
-1.21%
-6.82%

-0.24%
2.11%
2.71%
0.77%
-0.04%
-1.03%
-5.11%

-0.59%
2.15%
1.95%
0.86%
-0.13%
-1.47%
-5.36%

-0.32%
2.04%
1.88%
1.22%
-0.03%
-1.20%
-5.15%

-0.36%
2.27%
2.49%
0.93%
-0.02%
-1.17%
-5.73%

-0.26%
2.12%
2.71%
0.79%
-0.02%
-1.09%
-5.15%

0.42%
2.12%
3.03%
1.89%
0.64%
-0.26%
-4.53%

MAX to Obligated:
Construction Underway

MIN to Obligated:
Construction Underway

MED to Obligated:
Construction Underway

AVG to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Last to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Q3 to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Q2 to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Q1 to Obligated:
Construction Underway

First to Obligated:
Construction Underway

% of Cos t Growth to Tota l Progra m Cos t

-1.10%
2.71%
1.80%
0.59%
-0.19%
-2.76%
-7.42%

Table E8: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth to Obligated Funds in Dollar Value
(10 Programs - Construction Underway)
First to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Q1 to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Q2 to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Q3 to Obligated:
Construction Underway

Last to Obligated:
Construction Underway

AVG to Obligated:
Construction Underway

MED to Obligated:
Construction Underway

MIN to Obligated:
Construction Underway

MAX to Obligated:
Construction Underway

$ Amounts of Cos t Growth

-$198.090

-$181.638

-$116.286

-$151.845

-$146.850

-$150.489

-$120.629

-$61.020

-$265.854

Std Dev

$952.908

$869.536

$669.118

$681.463

$651.911

$735.803

$673.114

$619.094

$915.282

Ma x

$552.974

$466.835

$484.967

$416.649

$345.914

$454.508

$467.570

$552.974

$345.914

3rd Qua rti l e

$180.139

$172.608

$117.019

$94.364

$92.276

$117.513

$118.268

$182.423

$77.983

$3.756

$0.874

-$3.164

-$9.349

-$2.774

-$2.017

-$1.550

$11.662

-$14.269

-$88.496

-$60.169

-$41.044

-$86.016

-$69.031

-$66.339

-$45.660

-$28.366

-$145.207

Mea n

Medi a n
1s t Qua rti l e
Mi n

-$2,816.165 -$2,589.870 -$1,937.683 -$2,033.145 -$1,956.399 -$2,173.568 -$1,956.400 -$1,717.792 -$2,816.165

Upper 95% Mea n

$483.579

$440.391

$362.372

$335.644

$319.500

$375.872

$360.887

$381.854

$388.899

Lower 95% Mea n

-$879.760

-$803.666

-$594.944

-$639.334

-$613.199

-$676.851

-$602.146

-$503.893

-$920.607
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Appendix F

Figure F1: Cost Growth Percentage from First (Grey) and Last (Black) SAR to
Programmed Amounts

Figure F2: Cost Growth Percentage from First (Grey) and Last (Black) SAR to
Obligated Amounts – Construction Complete
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Figure F3: Cost Growth Percentage from First (Grey) and Last (Black) SAR to
Obligated Amounts – Construction Underway
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Appendix G

R
*

Q1 to Last (Positive Growth)

L
**

Q1 to Last (>|1%| Growth)

80's-90's Base Year

60's-70's Base Year

L
*

>$10B Total Program on Last SAR

L
**
L
*

>$1B Total Program on Last SAR

>5% Avg MILCON % to Total

R
**

<$50M MILCON on Last SAR

R
*

First to Last (>|2%| Growth)

>1% Avg MILCON % to Total

L R R
** ** *
L R
* **

First to Last (>|1%| Growth)

<$10M MILCON on Last SAR

L R R
*** *** **

First to Last (Positive Growth)

<0.5% Avg MILCON % to Total

Satellite

Missile

Launch Vehicle

Electronic

Aircraft

Modification

Prototype

≥15 Years of Reports

<10 Years of Reports

Table Legend:
* p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01
L left-tail significance
R right-tail significance

<5 Years of Reports

Table G1: Program MILCON Database Contingency Table Significance Results
(32 Programs)

R
*
R
*

L
**

Q1 to Last (>|2%| Growth)
R
***

Q2 to Last (Positive Growth)

R
*

Q2 to Last (>|1%| Growth)

L R
*** *

R
**

R L R
** ** *

Q2 to Last (>|2%| Growth)
R
**

Q3 to Last (Positive Growth)

R
*

R
**
L
*
L
*
R
**

R
*

R
**

Q3 to Last (>|1%| Growth)
Q3 to Last (>|2%| Growth)
MED to Last (Positive Growth)
L
*

MED to Last (>|1%| Growth)

R
**
R
**

R
**
R
**

R
*

R
*

L R
** *

2

4

2

MED to Last (>|2%| Growth)
AVG to Last (Positive Growth)

L
*

AVG to Last (>|1%| Growth)
AVG to Last (>|2%| Growth)
Total Significant Contingency Tables

0

2

4

2

0
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7

0

0

3

0

3

2

5

3

3

2

First to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
First to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

R L
* ***
L R
* *

L
**

L
**

≥75% of Contracts w/Modifications

≥75% of Projects w/Contract Modifications

<50 Contract Modifications

<200 Contract Modifications

<$3M in Contract Modifications

<$10M in Contract Modifications

≥2000 Base Year

>$10B Total Program on Last SAR

<$50M MILCON on Last SAR

<$10M MILCON on Last SAR

<10,000 Contracted Performance Period Days

<5,000 Contracted Performance Period Days

<10 Different Companies with Project Contracts

>$400M Programmed for Projects

L
*

<$50M Programmed for Projects

L
**

OCONUS Base(s) with Projects

<4 Bases with Projects

R
*

First to Programmed (Positive Growth)

<10 Total Projects

Aircraft

Modification

Protype

≥15 Years of Reports

<10 Years of Reports

Table Legend:
* p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01
L left-tail significance
R right-tail significance

<5 Years of Reports

Table G2: Project MILCON Database Contingency Table Significance Results
(10 Programs)

L
***
L
*

L
*
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L
*

Q1 to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
L
*

Q1 to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

L
**

Q2 to Programmed (Positive Growth)

R
*

Q2 to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
L
*

Q2 to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

L
*

R L
* **
R L L
** *** *

L
*
L
**

L
*

R
*
R
***

L
*
L
***

L
*

L
**
L
**

R
**

L
*

L L
** **

R
*

Q3 to Programmed (Positive Growth)
R
*

Q3 to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)

R
*

L
*

Q3 to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)
R
*

Last to Programmed (Positive Growth)
R
*

Last to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)

L
*

Last to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)
MED to Programmed (Positive Growth)
L
*

MED to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
L
*

MED to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)

R
*
R
***

L
**
L
**

L
*
L
***

R
**

L
*

L L
** **

L
*
3

L L
** **
3 3

L
*

R
*

AVG to Programmed (Positive Growth)
AVG to Programmed (>|1%| Growth)
AVG to Programmed (>|2%| Growth)
Total Significant Contingency Tables

0

1
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0

0

0

2
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